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1. The Importance of Financial Deepenina 
The role of the financial system and the nature of its con-
tributions to economic growth have received increasing attention. 
These contributions are associated with the provision of at least 
four types of service. The most basic is the provision of a me-
dium of exchange (monetization of the economy), which reduces the 
costs of conducting transactions in commodity and factor markets, 
increases the flow of trade, and enlarges market size. This im-
proves the productivity of resources, through specialization and 
the division of labor, greater competition, the use of modern 
technologies, and the exploitation of economies of scale. Since 
the efficiency of this service is reduced by inflation and cur-
rency substitution (dollarization), correct macroeconomic manage-
ment is crucial for adequate monetization. 
The financial system also provides services of intermedia-
tion between savers and investors, thus enhancing the accumula-
tion of capital and improving its allocation. In the absence of 
financial markets, producers are condemned to take advantage of 
their opportunities only to the extent allowed by their own re-
sources, while in other cases, when their resources are abundant 
compared to their productive options, they are forced to invest 
them at low marginal rates of return. 
There is no reason to expect that those with the capacity to 
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save, at a given moment, are necessarily those with the best in-
vestment opportunities. By making the division of labor between 
savers and investors possible, financial intermediaries channel 
resources from producers and regions with a limited growth poten-
tial and poor productive opportunities to those where a more rap-
id expansion of output is possible. 
Through the provision of intermediation services, therefore, 
the financial system contributes to the elimination of inferior 
uses of resources and, at the same time, it facilitates better 
alternative uses of these resources. This is accomplished when 
the financial system offers wealthholders new assets (for exam-
ple, bank deposits) that are more attractive forms of holding 
wealth than the unprofitable uses of resources thus eliminated. 
The intermediary, in turn, transfers these claims on resources to 
others, who possess better investment opportunities. 
From this perspective, the financial system offers valuable 
services and income-increasing opportunities not only to borrow-
ers, but also to depositors. Financial policies must create a 
balance, therefore, between the incentives offered to depositors 
(to attract their savings) and those offered to borrowers (to 
promote investment) • Many credit programs and institutions in 
developing countries, however, have relied heavily upon interna-
tional donor funds and central bank rediscounting, thus ignoring 
the provision of deposit services, while financial policies have 
repressed the rewards offered to depositors. 
The financial system also facilitates the reduction of risk 
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and the management of 1 iquidi ty and reserves. Most economic 
agents accumulate stores of value for emergencies or to take ad-
vantage of future investment opportunities. In the absence of 
attractive domestic financial assets, they are forced to hold 
foreign currencies, real estate and other tangible assets (in-
ventories, animals, jewelry) that yield low social returns. The 
financial system reduces the costs and risks of holding precau-
tionary and speculative reserves when it offers attractive forms 
of holding wealth, while it reduces the size of the required re-
serves, thus releasing resources for immediately productive uses, 
if it offers open lines of credit when these are needed. 
Finally, the financial system provides services of fiscal 
support for the public sector. This is an important contribu-
tion, in view of weak tax systems and the absence of securities 
markets. While the first three types of function (monetization, 
intermediation, and reserve management) are complementary, the 
fiscal function of the financial system may be in conflict with 
the first three. When abused, this fiscal role may lead to in-
flation, devaluation, and the crowding out of the private sector 
from domestic credit portfolios. In this instance, the financial 
system ceases to be an intermediary between private savers and 
investors, and it becomes a fiscal instrument to tax resources 
away from depositors, in order to finance the public-sector's 
current expenditures. Financial policy must strive, therefore, 
to strike a balance in the provision of these services. 
In summary, economic development both depends upon and con-
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tributes to the growth and diversification of the financial sys-
tem. Financial deepening matters to the extent to which it inte-
grates markets, it provides incentives for savings and invest-
ment, it encourages savers to hold a larger proportion of their 
wealth in the form of domestic financial assets, rather than in 
unproductive inflation hedges, foreign assets, and other money 
substitutes, and it channels resources away from low-return to-
wards better alternative uses. 
The extent to which these services are provided depends on 
the size of the financial system in real terms (its purchasing 
power), and on the efficiency of its performance, as measured by 
the magnitude and dispersion of the transactions costs that are 
imposed on all, actual and potential, market participants. 
Market fragmentation, the small size of the transactions, 
the high costs of information, risk and uncertainty increase the 
costs of financial transactions in developing countries. As a re-
sult, the net returns to depositors are low, the total costs of 
the funds to borrowers (including non-interest expenses) are 
high, the size of financial markets is small, the volume of funds 
channelled and the variety of the services provided are limited, 
and time horizons are short. 
Financial progress requires a reduction of these risks and 
transactions costs. This cannot be done by decree (for example, 
usury laws). Rather, it requires greater competition and market 
integration, the exploitation of economies of scale and of scope, 
professional portfolio management and diversification, the accu-
I 
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mulation of information, and the establishment of bank-customer 
relationships. Financial progress thus requires a hospitable 
regulatory and macroeconomic policy environment, viable insti-
tutions, and innovations in financial technology to reduce risks 
and transactions costs. 
2. Financial Deepening in Costa Rica 
During the 1960s and most of the 1970s, Costa Rica enjoyed a 
significant process of financial deepening and financial markets 
served as an important mechanism for economic growth. Following 
traditional measures of financial performance, such as the ratio 
of monetary aggregates to national income, the evolution of the 
Costa Rican financial markets would have been evaluated positive-
ly, compared to other developing countries. 
During that period, the range of services offered widened, 
the network of bank branches was substantially expanded, the re-
turns to domestic financial assets were positive, in real terms, 
and financial magnitudes, measured in constant prices, grew rap-
idly. Bank economic growth and price and exchange-rate stability 
explained this progress, even in the absence of explicit policy 
concern for financial development. 
In addition to being a small and open economy, up to the 
mid-1970s Costa Rica was characterized by remarkable price sta-
bility. Between 1950 and 1969, the average annual rate of change 
of the Consumer Price Index was below two percent per year. The 
country did not experience double-digit inflation until 1973. Ab-
sence of inflation reflected the openness of the economy and an 
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exchange rate that was fixed for long periods of time. The do-
mestic price level, therefore, was determined by international 
price movements, during a period when international inflation was 
minimal. 
The fixed exchange rate reflected, in turn, a revealed pre-
ference for monetary stability. In general, the country was 
willing to adopt enough of the monetary and fiscal discipline 
that was necessary to sustain the exchange rate and "maintenance 
of the external value of the colon" was a major objective of 
Central Bank policy. 
As a consequence of exchange-rate stability and the absence 
of inflation, as well as of the relatively high rate of growth of 
real income, during the 1960s and most of the 1970s, Costa Rica 
experienced a significant degree of financial deepening. The ra-
tio of the money supply {M2), in the broad sense of currency, and 
demand, savings, and time deposits, with respect ·to the GDP in-
creased from 19 percent in 1960 to 43 percent in 1978. This ra-
tio was comparatively high, particularly in contrast with other 
Latin American countries where high and erratic rates of infla-
tion had resulted in severe financial repression. It reflected 
an increasingly successful effort to mobilize domestic resources 
through the banking system, despite the comparatively low ratios 
of domestic savings to national income. 
Most of the "monetization" of the economy and the provision 
of a means of payments took place before the 1960s, since by then 
the ratio of the money supply in strict sense {Ml) to the GDP had 
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reached contemporary levels. Subsistence, non-monetary transac-
tions became an insignificant proportion of the Costa Rican econ-
omy since the early 1950s and banking habits were rapidly adopted 
by the population. The largest portion of the impressive process 
of financial deepening observed during the 1960s and 1970s was 
associated, therefore, with increasing holding of non-monetary 
deposits (quasimoney) . 
The ratio of quasimoney to the GDP increased from 4.2 per-
cent in 1961 to 19.2 percent in 1978. This reflected the diver-
sification of financial portfolios, in order to more closely sa-
tisfy diverse tastes for returns, risk, and liquidity. Also, as 
inflationary pressures increased after the mid-1970s and the op-
portunity cost of transactions balances increased, these were in-
creasingly kept in new forms, different from checking accounts. 
The increasing mobilization of funds through the banking 
system made possible the rapid expansion of domestic credit. Be-
tween 1961 and 1971, the ratio of domestic credit to the GDP in-
creased from 31 to 37 percent and it reached 42 percent in 1978. 
The higher credit to GDP ratios, when compared to the M2 to GDP 
ratios reflected the increasing role of foreign savings in fi-
nancing the credit portfolios of the banking system. 
Despite financial deepening, Costa Rica continued to rely 
heavily on foreign savings for the financing of domestic invest-
ment. In addition, numerous regulations and the administrative 
allocation of credit (topes de cartera) fragmented financial mar-
kets and increased transaction costs for all market participants. 
8 
Transactions costs were further increased by the bureaucratic 
style of the nationalized banking system, which had no incentive 
to modernize the supply of its services. The monopoly of the four 
state banks in the mobilization of monetary deposits (checking 
and savings accounts) led to a disregard for the interests of the 
depositors, while the excess demands for loans, as interest rates 
dropped below market levels, led to the increasing use of non-
economic considerations in the rationing of credit. 
Moreover, the loan portfolios of the nationalized banks 
showed an increasing concentration: among those privileged to 
have access to the loans, a few captured the largest proportion 
of the funds loaned. As a consequence of this, few benefited 
from the implicit interest-rate subsidy, particularly during in-
flationary periods, when the real rates of interest on loans be-
came particularly negative. 
During the 1960s, the interest rates charged on loans by the 
nationalized banks were positive in real terms and implied only a 
moderate subsidy, to the extent that they may have not reflected 
the full opportunity cost of claims on resources in the economy. 
During the 1970s, on the other hand, the implicit subsidy was 
substantial, even under conservative assumptions about the op-
portunity cost of credit. Interest rates were negative in real 
terms during the most of the mid-1970s and early 1980s. 
As an extreme example, under the conservative assumption 
that the social opportunity cost of the loans was 10 percent per 
year, in real terms, the rate effectively charged on loans during 
.... , 
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1974 was a negative -20 percent. Thus, the implicit rate of sub-
sidy was 30 percent. Agricultural credit represented close to 60 
percent of the value of the gross agricultural output and over 
one-half of the loan portfolio of the banks. This meant that, in 
the important case of agriculture, the grant transferred through 
subsidized credit was equivalent to 20 to 25 percent of the value 
of the gross agricultural output. On the other hand, only be-
tween 30 and 40 percent of the agricultural producers had access 
to bank loans, while the remaining 70 percent were excluded. 
In addition, there was a high degree of portfolio concentra-
tion. In effect, in the case of the Banco Nacional de Costa Ri-
ca, which granted over one-half of all agricultural credit in the 
country, less than two percent of the borrowers (number of loans) 
accounted for over 60 percent of the amounts loaned for agricul-
ture. About 10 percent of the number of loans corresponded to 
over 83 percent of the amount of credit granted. 
This meant that about one percent of the agricultural pro-
ducers of Costa Rica were receiving over 65 percent of the agri-
cultural credit granted by the banks and over 65 percent of a 
substantial subsidy, equivalent to almost 25 percent of the value 
of the agricultural output, in 1974. 
Due to the decline in inflation rates during the second-half 
of the 1970s, as well as the increase in nominal rates of inter-
est, the magnitude of the subsidy declined, but it remained im-
portant. It significantly increased again during the early 1980s, 
while concentration of the loan portfolio was more accentuated. 
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In addition, by the end of the decade it was estimated that 
about 50 percent of the loan portfolio of the banks represented 
defaulted loans. There was a significant transfer on this count, 
too, to the few privileged very large borrowers who did not repay 
their loans. 
3. Impact of the Crisis on the Financial System 
During the 1980s, Costa Rica has been in the midst of an 
economic crisis, which resulted from a combination of long-term 
trends and unfavorable short-term, foreign and domestic, circum-
stances. The long-term, structural determinants of the crisis 
reflected a contradiction between the country's basic character-
istics (small, open economy, relatively labor abundant, and with 
very specialized natural resources) and the features of the 
protectionist strategy of development adopted in the late 1950s. 
High costs and distortions resulted from the penalization of 
agriculture and the bias against exports. 
The short-term determinants of the crisis have reflected 
major external shocks, such as sharp swings in the country's in-
ternational terms of trade and drastic changes in the terms and 
conditions of access to international financial markets, as well 
as the unfortunate domestic policies adopted in response. 
The financial system suffered significantly with the crisis, 
probably more than any other sector in the economy. There has 
been essentially a fiscal reason for this. When the stagnation 
and contraction of real incomes in the early 1980s reduced the 
.... , 
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rate of growth of government revenues, the authorities faced se-
vere constraints for an additional mobilization of domestic re-
sources with the use of the conventional tools of taxation. At 
the same time, public-sector expenditures and implicit, non-re-
corded subsidies and entitlements kept growing, at rates increas-
ingly faster than those associated with revenues. 
Given the increasing discrepancy between public-sector reve-
nues and expenditures, for a while the authorities financed bud-
get deficits by placing their debt abroad, in order to cushion 
the effect that otherwise the income decline would have had on 
aggregate spending. When the limit to the accumulated stock of 
public external debt which foreign lenders were willing to accept 
was finally reached, and programmed expenditures had not been 
reduced yet, the authorities forced the placement of their debt 
with the domestic financial system. 
Domestic financing of public-sector deficits had two conse-
quences. The expansion of domestic credit at a rate faster than 
the rate that would have maintained domestic price stability made 
it impossible to sustain the fixed exchange-rate regime and it 
resulted in the loss of international monetary reserves, acceler-
ating inflation, and eventually to devaluation. On the other 
hand, the private sector was crowded out of domestic credit port-
folios. Thus, growing fiscal deficits were financed with the 
loss of international monetary reserves, accelerating borrowing 
abroad, the inflation tax, and financial repression. 
The Wholesale Price Index increased 65 percent in 1981 and 
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108 percent in 1982. December to December, this index augmented 
117 percent in 1981 and 79 percent in 1982. The Consumer Price 
Index, in turn, increased 65 percent in 1981 and 90 percent in 
1982. Exchange controls, multiple exchange rates, devaluation, 
and floating rates followed. The accompanying financial re-
pression led to a significant contraction, in real terms, of the 
domestic financial system. 
The rapid process of financial deepening experienced by Cos-
ta Rica in the earlier decades had accelerated in the 1970s. Be-
tween 1970 and 1975, domestic funds mobilization by the banking 
system had increased at an average rate of 6 percent per year, in 
real terms. Moreover, between 1975 and 1978, this rate reached 
an exceptional 20 percent per year, as a reflection of the coffee 
boom. Between 1978 and 1982, however, domestic funds mobiliza-
tion declined at an annual rate of - 6.9 percent. 
A high interest-elasticity and a high-income elasticity of 
quasimoney had also been reflected in the rapid growth of this 
component of the demand for money. Thus, the proportion of quasi-
money in M2 increased from 34 percent in 1970, to 55 percent in 
1978, and to 66 percent in 1981. Firms and households began to 
use quasimoney as transaction balances, as inflationary expecta-
tions grew. Moreover, transactions balances in foreign curren-
cies became very important. By 1981, as a consequence of curren-
cy substitution, deposits in foreign currencies represented 28 
percent of quasimoney. Deposits in dollars represented up to 11 
percent of the Costa Rican GDP in 1983. 
\ . 
.. 
-,,, 
. 
r 
13 
The contraction of the Costa Rican banking system during the 
crisis was dramatic. In constant 1978 prices, domestic funds 
mobilization dropped from 12, 756 million colones in 1978, to 
9,568 million in 1982. By 1982, M2 represented only 68.7 percent 
of its 1978 real value, since it dropped from 12, 105 to 8, 322 
million colones. The sharpest reduction was experienced by Ml, 
which diminished from 5,438 million colones in 1978, to 3.032 
million in 1982. This was only 55.8 percent of the value reached 
in 1978 and was comparable to the level already reached by 1970. 
The reduction of quasimonetary deposits was less dramatic. By 
1982 they represented 79.3 percent of their 1978 real value. 
A similar contraction was experienced by the real value of 
domestic credit. Between 1970 and 1975, real domestic credit had 
increased at an average annual rate of 7.1 percent. This rate of 
increase more than doubled between 1975 and 1978. Although do-
mestic resource mobilization declined from this year on, domestic 
credit increased through 1980, when it reached 14,097 million 
constant colones of 1978, aided by the inflow of foreign funds. 
During 1981 and 1982, however, domestic credit dropped dramatic-
ally. By 1982 it had declined to 5,875 million colones, at cons-
tant 1978 prices; only 41.7 percent of the 1980 level. After 
some recuperation in 1983, real domestic credit was still at its 
pre-1975 level. 
The contraction was particularly acute in the case of do-
mestic credit for the private sector, which declined from 8,544 
million of constant colones in 1978, to 3, 060 million by 1982, 
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only 35.8 percent of the former value. In a few years, the Costa 
Rican banking system's supply of real loanable funds to the pri-
vate sector had been reduced to one-third of its original value. 
Only in 1981, the real rate of change of domestic credit for the 
private sector became - 49.4 percent, followed by another drop of 
- 23.0 percent in 1982. 
Costa Rican firms experienced a painful loss of access to 
bank credit for investment and working capital, in part because 
of the erosion of the purchasing power of the loan portfolios 
with rapid inflation, in part because of the crowding out of the 
private sector in those portfolios. This, in turn, took place at 
a time when inflation and devaluation had reduced the real value 
of their own funds and when, for all practical purposes, these 
firms had lost their access to foreign borrowing, in view of the 
moratorium on the Costa Rican public external debt and general-
ized turmoil in Central America. 
Domestic credit for the public sector continued to increase 
through 1980, when it reached 6,247 million of constant colones. 
The following two years, however, it also dramatically declined. 
By 1982, it amounted to only 2, 852 million, which represented 
45.6 percent of the 1980 level. Thus, in the race between the 
expansion of credit for the public sector and inflation, even-
tually inflation was the easy winner. The strategy was self-
defeating. Once the country's international monetary reserves 
were exhausted, accelerated credit expansion contributed to the 
decline of its real value. 
\ 
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The crowding out of the private sector in loan portfolios 
was pronounced. The share of the private sector in domestic 
credit had only declined from 87.1 percent in 1961 to 79.5 per-
cent by 1975. However, by 1981 this share had dropped to 55.7 
percent. Moreover, from the perspective of the annual net incre-
ments in domestic credit, before 1974 the private sector received 
at least three-quarters every year. This participation had de-
clined to one-third by 1980. The evolution of the shares of the 
two sectors in the allocation of domestic credit reflects the 
fiscal root of the process of financial repression of the late 
1970s and early 1980s. 
The annual flow of credit for productive activities declined 
from 6, 575 million colones in 1978, to 3, 187 million, in 1978 
prices, by 1982. This contraction was accompanied by significant 
changes in the allocation of the loan portfolios. The sharpest 
reduction was experienced in the flows of credit for services, 
transportation and storage, housing, and manufacturing, all of 
which declined to about one-third of their original value. Per-
sonal credit experienced a similar reduction. Credit for agri-
culture and livestock as well as for commerce diminished to about 
one-half of its original value. 
The contraction, therefore, was not uniform: it was at the 
expense of the private sector, of the mobilization of deposits in 
domestic currency, of the regulated segment of the market, of the 
share of productive sectors in loan portfolios, and of the access 
of the smaller, poorer, riskier producers to financial services. 
16 
As a result of the contraction of the real size of the financial 
system, the ratio of M2 to the GDP declined from 41 percent in 
198.0 to 29 percent in 1981. If dollar-denominated deposits are 
excluded, the reduction was from 35 to 21 percent. 
Moreover, significant portions of the portfolio of the bank-
ing system became overdue. To the extent to which these loans 
have not been written off, there has been an underestimation of 
the actual reduction in the banks' loanable funds. The decline 
of these financial ratios has also reflected, in part, the loss 
in relative market share of the regulated, institutionalized mar-
ket. In recent years, there has been a vigorous development of 
non-regulated financial institutions. Not constrained by Central 
Bank and interest-rate regulations, these intermediaries have 
been more aggressive in the mobilization of domestic resources 
than the formal market. In this sense, the reduction in the lev-
els of financial intermediation has been less than reported here. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, financial deepening matters for economic 
growth and stability. Adequate macroeconomic management is 
critical, in order to create an environment hospitable to 
financial market development. Abuse of the fiscal function of 
the financial sector led, in the early 1980s, to a dramatic 
contraction of the Costa Rican requlated financial system. Both 
the degree of monetizatio.n and of intermediation declined. 
Economic recovery will require, in turn, renewed financial 
r .. 
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deepening. Macroeconomic stabilization, fiscal control, and 
financial liberalization will be essential ingredients in the 
process of recovery. 
NOTES: 
* Claudio Gonzalez-Vega is Professor of Agricultural Economics 
and of Economics at The Ohio State University. Research for 
this paper was sponsored by the Project on Policy Tools for 
Rural Finance in Costa Rica, financed by the USAID Mission 
in San Jose, as part of the cooperative agrement between 
AID, Science and Technology Division, and the Ohio State 
University on Experimental Approaches to Rural Savings. 
